GOODBYE OIL HARRIER

The Oil Harier as the Skua in Captown in January 2010. Photo Ian Shiffman for South African Ports and Ships Maritime News. 

I was informed by a number of sources that the venerable Oil Harrier, then the Skua has gone to the breakers. I was mate of this vessel when it was brand new in 1976, and looking back it was useless, even though in this photo it looks quite the part.

It was the first OIL ship to be provided with controllable pitch propellers which avoided the almost unendurable delay when one wanted to go from ahead to astern, but apart from that it was extremely difficult to work because of the small size of the work drums. Our baptism on this brand new craft was to go out to lay anchors for some Sedco rig on the location of the Magnus Field. The thing was provided with chain chasers, the latest thing at the time, and we all struggled with them, mainly tending to bring back the anchor to the rig after laying it. We on the Harrier had the additional problem of having to connect up the wire from the second drum half way through the run, or disconnect when going the other way. Unusually the ship was provided with storage reels for wire underdeck, but similarly to the main work drums they could not store much wire, and it was difficult to get the leads right.

At one point we were weathered off and while dodging took a wave straight through one of the bridge windows, leaving us with nothing but the steering (Fortunately). We ran before the weather off the Northernmost of the North Sea charts, while fixing the broken window using some blankets, a profiled engine room floor plate and some wood out of the dry store. Once we’d fixed it we went back to work. All the same I was sorry to see it go.

PIRACY OR NOT

I have just returned from holiday in India where it was being reported that an Indian tanker with 140,000 tonnes of Iraq¡ oil on board had been detained by the Iranian revolutionary guard, and forced to berth in Bandar Abbas. The Iranians claim that they had detected pollution problems, but the Indian press think that it is something to do with the fact that an Iranian ship has been detained in Mumbai for two years. Is it then acceptable for one regime with a problem to capture a ship owned by another, in retaliation for some problem or other? The ship held in India is there due to a financial problem, actually nothing to do with that country, and the Indians have allowed crew changes to take place. One assumes that it has a writ nailed to the mast.  But what of the Desh Shanti, the Indian ship? More on this story later.

RAMCO CRUSADER

The Ramco Crusader. Photo Jan Plug.

The Ramco Crusader sank the other day off Brazil with no loss of life. It was in its way a historic ship. There follows an excerpt from ‘The History of the Supply Ship’. 

"Probably within days of the arrival on the scene of the first of the Maersk R class the Norwegian designers were sharpening their pencils to see what they could do with a larger hull and four big engines. Ulsteins drew the UT708 and the Maritime Engineering developed the ME303. Seaforth Maritime who might always have been the most innovative of the British companies commissioned UT708s from Norway and ME303s from Korea, and while the former entered service almost seamlessly  the Korean built ships, arrived with something of a fanfare, and rumours of building problems and difficulties with the equipment echoed round Aberdeen.

"One thing that everyone understood as soon as they saw the new ships was that the ME303 was extremely large, almost a different type of ship from its forbears. The 14,000 bhp was not that different from that available to the last of the Maersk Rs and the winch was made up of one tow drum and one workdrum, both of moderate size. But the accommodation seemed to be vast, and the bridge with its sofas, sinks, tea making spaces and toilets took the watch-keeping areas to a whole new level of luxury. Visitors looked down from the bridge onto the after deck and had to strain their eyes to see what was going on."

HUMAN ERROR AND HEAVY WEATHER DAMAGE

FR8 Venture from Shipspotting. 

In January 1993 the tanker Braer left Mongstad loaded with 84,000 tonnes of Norwegian crude, bound for Quebec. The ship headed out into the teeth of southerly gale and made slow progress towards the Atlantic. During the 4th January the officers noticed that some pipes which were stowed on the afterdeck had broken free and were hammering back and forth across the deck as the ship rolled. The captain was informed but he decided that nothing should be done until the weather improved. Later in the day the boiler which generated the steam for heating the heavy fuel used by the main engine failed, resulting in a decision to put the main engine on diesel. Early on 5th the main engine stopped. The fuel had been found to be contaminated, and the engineers had, for hours, been trying to clear the diesel settling and service tanks of water. The engine problem turned into an emergency as the ship drifted towards the southern tip of the Shetland Islands, and at 1119 the ship grounded at Garths Ness. The water was found to have entered the fuel tanks through vents damaged by the loose pipes on the afterdeck.

On 11th November 2006 the 74,000 dwt tanker FR8 Venture shipped two large waves over the bow, which resulted in the deaths of two ABs and serious injuries to one ordinary seaman. The ship had been engaged in ship to ship transfers in Scapa Flow and, on completion of the work, headed out into the Pentland Firth while the crew were still securing the deck. The event was investigated by the UK Marine Accident Investigation Branch which, not surprisingly, determined that the deck should have been secured before the ship left sheltered waters. The owners subsequently modified their Operations Manual to ensure that the decks of their tankers would be secured or unsecured in such a manner that the crew would be, as far as possible, protected. 

The captain of the FR8 Venture is now aware that he should not have left sheltered waters before securing the deck and has probably never let anything like that happen to him again, and that the masters of other vessels of the same company have taken some notice of the change to the Operations Manual. However, one would think that the ability to deal with heavy weather would be one of the skills necessary to command a ship. After all, it is something seafarers have to deal with throughout their working lives, and if shipmasters do not have the skills to safeguard their crew and to minimise the possibility of damage to their vessels, is survival only due to luck?

It is likely that the approach taken to adverse weather differs between those in command of small ships, and those in command of large ones. Small ships will not survive adverse weather unless they are kept watertight and weathertight, and this knowledge is a considerable incentive for the captains and the crews. Large ships, and most tankers are large, some of them very large, may be relying on their shear size to see them through. 

The FR8 Venture and the Braer were included here to illustrate the fact that in both cases a specific approach to adverse weather would have prevented the accidents. It is pretty obvious that if the captain of the FR8 Venture had considered the possibility of waves climbing over the bow of the ship, he would not have left shelter while the crew were still securing the anchors. The MAIB also suggested that possibly there would still have been scope for him to turn away from the weather until the work was completed. One must assume that he thought that his ship was sufficiently large for it to be unaffected by the five metre seas running outside in the Pentland Firth. The terrible environmental effect of the grounding and break-up of the Braer at Garths Ness could have been prevented simply by ensuring that the steel sections on the afterdeck had been properly secured. The report into the incident also suggests that they could possibly have been re-secured if the vessel had been hove too on a heading which would have allowed the crew to gain access to the area. Not to have taken this action, in the words of the investigators, “suggests a fundamental lack of basic seamanship”

And this is probably the point. One could look upon adverse weather as an act of god, visited on the ship as it goes about its lawful business, ploughing a furrow through the ocean between the port of departure and the destination, in which case the only thing to do is to press on at best speed. Or else the occasional storms which beset any ship on passage could be looked on in the same way as sandbanks or islands, or port approaches. These things require positive action such as alterations of course or reductions in speed. And here it has to be faced. The captain will just have to fill in the form, to let the charterers know why the date and time of his arrival is going to be different from that estimated at the time of departure. 

In the words of SOLAS Regulation 10-1.

 The master shall not be constrained by shipowner, charterer or any other person from taking any decision which, in the professional judgement of the master, is necessary for safe navigation, in particular in severe weather and in heavy seas.’

This article was written for Safety at Seas International in 2008.

PETROBRAS AND DP

This is a photo of a few odd ships on hire to Petrobras, courtesy of Jan Plug.

I have been in correspond-ence with a deck officer working on a ship hired to them who told me that they have a rule that all ships working for that company must be on DP if within the 500 metre zone of any of their offshore installations. But surely not all these ships are fitted with DP!

This might mean therefore that all ships fitted with DP must be on DP if within the 500 metre zone. My correspondent was really complaining that this rule does not offer much scope for training ‘on the sticks’, as we used to have it.

Of course if the ship moved outside the 500 metre zone then the DP system might not have time to register trends in the environmental conditions, and hence there would be problems when closed up to the installation.

But if the DP operators on the bridge do not have the necessary skill to drive the ship should the DP fail there must be an increased risk of collision. On at least one occasion where the DP has failed the operator has switched the system to joystick, and this secondary system has taken immediate action to restore the heading resulting in the stern of the ship whacking into one of the legs of the rig.

When considering such problems never forget that old Petrobras maxim, ‘No situation is so bad that it can’t get worse’