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THE MAERSK SALT 200s
An Artist's Rendering of the New SALT 200 Design
I usually try to avoid including press releases for newbuildings. After all, they seem to just go on and on, to the point that one feels that there must be many more ships out than there is employment for. And some companies seem to go to it with such enthusiasm that they must intend to put others out of business altogether. One such company is Maersk Supply, who have many ships under the Danish and the British flags, and up to now although their ships have been extremely well found and very powerful and of very high specification, they have looked entirely conventional. With the advantage, for the guys on the forecastle, that they can stand back and throw their heaving lines towards the quayside when tying up.
However, in 2014 they are facing the future with a new anchor-handler design which tips its cap in the direction of the wave piercing bow, and the accommodation for more than 50 people in single cabins. Although the full details are yet to be announced, doubtless the winch will be capable of storing many thousands of metres of wire or fibre rope for deep water work, and at a guess will probably be provided with a Triplex MDH, where MDH stands for Multi Deck Handler, since Maersk have always been enthusiasts for the Triplex shark’s jaw. It is noted that the six ships on order have a moderate 23000 bhp available giving 230 tons bollard pull, which is as much as one would need for virtually all mooring activities, but maybe not with enough for pulling seabed ploughs.
SALT are a new company based in Norway, but they have already designed a contender for ship of the year in 2014, with the Juanita, a large platform ship which is billed as being provided with a new propulsion system using “permanent magnet technology”. And despite the availability of diagrams of this system on the internet it did not make any sense to me.
A BLACK DAY FOR SEAFARERS
But fortunately not quite as black a day as was reported in October. 27th. On November 11th the Korean courts found the former captain of the Sewol guilty of gross negligence rather than homicide and sentenced him to 36 years in jail. The Chief Engineer was sentenced to 30 years for the specific charge of not helping two injured crew members, and the press reported that the 13 remaining crew members were sentenced to terms in prison of between five and 20 years. However the prosecution said that they were going to appeal against the “not guilty” verdicts on the homicide charges, so it is not over yet. The anger and distress of the family members of those who died is understandable, and it brings home to us that regardless of the reasons for a marine accident, the management of the resulting emergency is what is going to be important to the general public. It would not have mattered to anyone what had happened to the ship if everyone had been rescued. And it is probably that even those who initiated the modifications to the ferry without due consideration for safety would not have been censured in any way. But even without the threat of prosecution I am sure that all serving shipmasters, and if it comes to that their crews, hope that they are sufficiently well trained, courageous and quick thinking to be able to do the right thing in an emergency.
THE TOR VIKING II TO THE RESCUE
A US Coast Guard Photo of the Tor Viking II on Its Way to the Rescue
For some reason an event which occurred back in December 2010 has surfaced in the media, maybe because some video concerning it has been published on YouTube.
This was the bulk carrier Golden Seas which had had a turbocharger failure, which turned its maximum speed to about two knots. In the strong winds and high seas it was being pushed in the direction of Atka Island, off Alaska.
At the time Shell had the Tor Viking II, one of the trio of icebreaking anchor-handlers owned managed by Viking Supply, on hire. They released it to go and rescue the ship, which was 400 miles away.
The video shows a lot of swinging spanners on shadow boards, as an illustration of the stresses on the ship as it powered through heavy seas in the direction of the casualty.
When it arrived at the Golden Seas, it apparently only took 15 minutes for it to take it in tow, and head back towards Dutch Harbour, now at a more moderate speed.
This event brings home to us today the need for coastal states to be provided with some sort of emergency towing vessels. In this case they were lucky the Tor Viking II was on hand. Tragedy was also recently averted when a ship broke down off the west coast of British Columbia. A Canadian Coast Guard vessel managed to take the ship, the Simushir, in tow but its tow line failed three times, and it was not until the arrival of the American tug Barbara Foss, that those monitoring the emergency could breath a sigh of relief. Let’s all think about getting Emergency Towing Vessels!
OUCH!
The Odyssea Courage With Bits of the Q4000 Lifeboat on the Bow
In the early morning of Saturday 15th November the platform supply vessel Odyssea Courage hammered into the stern of the Helix well intervention semi-submersible Q4000, in the Gulf of Mexico. The ship then retired hurt to Port Fouchon, and was photographed with the remains of a lifeboat on the bow, and the rig was allowed to continue working, with its three remaining lifeboats still available.
This is not the first time a collision between a ship and a rig has been featured in this newsletter, and it probably won’t be the last. In fact despite the increasing availability of dynamic positioning, supposedly removing the human factor from the task of operating a ship close to an offshore structure, things don’t seem to be getting any better.
Your scribe has investigated these sort of collisions on behalf of clients, has reviewed reports on them, written collision risk management manuals, and actually been master of a ship which ran into a rig. So for those who would like to know more here are a few words on the topic starting off with my own experience.
My own collision occurred when I was master of a British registered anchor-handler (so it had to be a long time ago) supporting a Pentagon rig in the UK sector of the North Sea. Pentagons are unusual in having five columns. From starboard aft the legs are named A to E with C being the bow leg. Back in those days we used to tie up, first dropping an anchor and backing in to be secured by ropes to the port and starboard quarters. On this day I had lined the ship up with the rig and started backing up, pulling the string which operated the ship’s whistle once, which indicated to the mate that he should let the anchor go. As I closed up with the D leg I pulled the string for the whistle twice, which was the signal for the mate to stop letting out the anchor, but there was no sound, apart from that of the anchor chain still rattling out. I went to the engine controls and pulled them both up into the neutral position. Nothing happened. I put the engines to full ahead, but still nothing happened and the ship hit the rig pretty hard, stamping an outline of the welds on the port quarter into the leg, but fortunately not making a hole. Then the engines caught and we powered away.
This was a collision due to mechanical failure, actually lack of control air. Mechanical failure is the least likely to result in contact between a ship and a rig, although failures of the DP (dynamic positioning) systems and a consequent failure of the watch keeper to take the right corrective action are the cause of some.
But it appears that the most likely causes of collision are lack of attention on the parts of the watch keepers on ships rendezvousing with offshore installations. Don’t they have radar? I hear you ask, and the answer is yes of course, and in some cases the offshore installation has radar as well.
So following the progress of a typical collision, which may or may not be what happened to the Odyssea Courage, we can start with the ship a few miles off, approaching the rig at transit speed with the intent of working cargo on arrival. There may well have been an exchange of operational messages between the watch keeper and the control room of the unit, hence the vessel is expected. Thereafter it may be the lack of attention on the part of the watch keeper which results in the collision. On one occasion, in the Irish Sea, the Captain had sent the lookout down to call the crew for the day’s work, and he himself had reduced speed and got on with a bit of paperwork. But the reduction in speed was not enough, and looking up from the chart table he saw the platform close ahead. He went full astern but the collision still occurred.
At a more basic level it is possible that the watch keeper is the only person in the Pilot House and so, in order to get everyone ready for work on arrival, he goes down below and calls people, and while he’s there he pours himself a cup of coffee, and starts chatting to others as they arrive in the Mess Room. He has forgotten what is going on upstairs! Some people would not believe that this could be happening, but it does, and has done on a number of occasions.
Similarly when the regulations require the presence of a standby vessel, these ships can themselves become a hazard, particularly when the watch keeper loses concentration, falls asleep, and more commonly in today’s world, become absorbed in a computer game. We can have a little sympathy. It is a boring job.
In safety engineer’s jargon these are known as “visiting vessel collisions”. This is as opposed to “passing vessel collisions”, and it might appear that the latter would be more frequent. Yes, they have happened but there have been very few, yet it is passing vessel collisions which most exercise the minds of the owners and operators of offshore installations. What would the offshore management do if they saw a ship approaching them at full speed? Would they even see an approaching vessel? How much time would they have to do anything? There are some answers to these questions, most of which depend on the availability of a suitable detection system – a radar, a standby vessel or something. But even given a warning what should the prudent OIM (Offshore Installation Manager) do? Some advocate evacuation, but what if the ship turns off at the last moment and sinks a lifeboat full of people? After all these years there are still more questions than answers. However, today there is a means by which the possibility of collision with a passing vessel may be reduced. It is a legal requirement that all ships of more than 300 gross tons must be fitted with AIS (an Automatic Identification System), and nothing prevents this relatively low cost system from being fitted to offshore installations and mobile units. Passing vessels would therefore see the objects on their various navigation systems, and could take appropriate action to keep clear.
So given all of the above the best opportunity the offshore installation has to reduce the possibility of collision is to control the operation of visiting vessels. And once more I hear people saying “surely they do that!” Well, yes and no. There is a tendency for those on board offshore installations to put quite unwarranted faith in the machinery and the management of visiting vessels. So here are a few hints. First set a safety perimeter round the installation. The UK sector has a 500 metre perimeter by law, but it does not have to be that. Then set up a requirement for any visiting vessel to linger at the edge of the perimeter and check its equipment and then to approach with caution, and make sure they know they have to do this. Try to keep the lee side of the facility available. And don’t let work carry on in adverse weather, even if the ship says it can.
And finally Never Let Your Visiting Vessels Head Straight for the Rig!!
RIGS TO REEFS
A Hurricane Damaged Offshore Platform
One of the reasons oil rigs offshore Europe are protected by a 500 metre exclusion zone is that otherwise fishing boats would be sailing right up to the legs, because fish love oil related architecture. Even though they can’t get that close to the structures above the surface they trawl alongside the undersea pipelines, which are also favoured by our fishy friends.
Out in the Gulf of Mexico it is accepted that the presence of the oil platforms have created wonderful habitats for fish, in an area which was otherwise reef free. But in recent years the earliest platforms have ceased production and have therefore been removed, thereby removing the marine habitat.
This loss of habitat has been so severe that the various government bodies which have replaced the MMS (Minerals Management Service) have been lobbied, and as a result the “Rigs to Reefs” programme was initiated.
Of particular interest today is the fact that a platform which was toppled by hurricane Ike in 2008 is scheduled for removal and a Louisiana senator has lent weight to the campaign to allow it to stay. “…the thriving ecosystem that has grown around it is already playing an important role,” he wrote.
However the current regulatory regime the Bureau of Safety and Environmental Enforcement (BSEE) seems unlikely to accede to the request, suggesting it amounts to “ocean dumping”. More on this story later!
I am an occasional visitor to the gCaptain Forum, which is a site visited mainly by American mariners with a whole variety of questions, and sometimes with answers. The title of this piece was a question raised recently.
I’m going to start with a bit of discussion about the Bibby Stockholm, which is an accommodation barge tied up in Portland (UK) currently inhabited by about 500 illegal immigrants costing the British Government, according to the British newspaper the Guardian, £91 per day per inhabitant.
THE ARCTIC SUNRISE AFFAIR
The Arctic Sunrise. Photo Jan Plug
Today, a little more than a month after the Greenpeace protest at the Priraziomnaya, where the protesters claimed that they just climbed aboard the rig in order to plant a banner, all those involved are still in jail in Murmansk and the ship is at anchor outside the port. This after Russian special forces were helicoptered aboard and took over.
The 28 Greenpeace activists and two journalists were originally charged with piracy but more recently the charge was reduced to ‘hooliganism’, which carries a lesser sentence. This is all extremely harsh and honestly you would think that the organization – Greenpeace - would have assessed the risks of such a venture. But then they don’t seem to assess the risks relating to their other activities very well.
Of course not everyone will be distressed by this sequence of events. For many years it appears that the environmentalists have used the oil industry as a means of publicizing their activities, with the possible objective of increasing their revenue. And of course in the west the oil companies have taken a view that the best action is no action, particularly after Brent Spar where Greenpeace succeeded in reversing Shell’s decision to dump the redundant structure in the Atlantic. Shell possibly made the error of taking aggressive action against the protesters who had taken up residence on the structure, by spraying them with fire monitors from support vessels. This had the effect of ensuring that the event remained in the news. In the end much of what Greenpeace had claimed about the spar turned out to be false, but by then it was too late.
SOMETHING FROM THE COSTA CONCORDIA TRIAL
There have been reports all over the media about the testimony of the Moldovan dancer Domnica Cemortan at the trial of Captain Schettino, who faces charges of causing a shipwreck and abandoning ship. She admitted that, after all, she and the Captain had a relationship. This was said, therefore, to cast doubt on her previous testimony that he had been a hero, in navigating the ship to shallow water. I don’t think we needed her new admission for us to be doubting his heroics, since according to the accident investigation it was an extraordinary stroke of luck that the ship drifted onto the ledge outside Giglio harbour. And there may be some cynics who felt that her presence on the bridge of the ship, with neither a ticket or a place on the crew list, indicated that she was more than a friend.
CAPTAIN PHILLIPS
Tom Hanks as Captain Phillips in the film.
The other week I went to see the much lauded film ‘Captain Phillips’, actually named after the captain of the Maersk Alabama, who was taken hostage by a group of Somali pirates back in 2009.
The film was directed by Paul Greengrass, and I find that, if it is possible for one to be a fan of a film director, I am a fan. He just hits the spot when it comes to tension and action. And so it is with Captain Phillips and the Maersk Alabama.
Even if you remember the event and how it all went the film will have you on the edge of your seat throughout. And even for we seafarers there is virtually nothing we can dispute – except actually the fact that Captain Phillips did not appear to have anyone hand over command to him. But that would have been a dramatic disaster, so they are forgiven.
However, the broadsheets have reported that in the real world eleven of the Maersk Alabama crew are taking Maersk to court for damages, since it seems that the captain of the title ignored seven warning of possible pirate attacks and failed to take any notice of company instructions on means of defence.
And even more interesting, or entertaining, depending on your frame of mind, is that the $30,000 from the ship’s safe which was given to the pirates, and could have been recovered, has disappeared.
I’m trying to avoid spoilers here!
THE NEFTEGAZ 67 AND THE YAO HAI COLISION
The Neftegaz 55 - a sister ship to the Neftegaz 67. Photo Wullie Bremner
The Nautical Institute Hong Kong branch recently held an evening seminar where they discussed the Neftegaz 67/ Yao Hai collision which resulted in a court case and the imprisonment of the captain of the supply ship. They were specifically discussing the relevance of Rule 9 of the Collision Regulations which determines the actions to be taken by vessels in narrow channels. The event was reported in the NI magazine ‘Seaways’, and the reason for this discussion was that the success of the prosecution hinged on the acceptance that Rule 9 was applicable at the time. (Readers should be aware that I have interpreted the documents available on the internet). The accident resulted in the deaths of 18 of the 25 crew members on board the Neftegaz 67.
So how did it go? The accident occurred on the evening of 22nd March 2008. The Yao Hai was a bulk carrier carrying 57000 tons of maize, and was inbound to Shekou on a course a little to the south of west and the Neftegaz 67 was a supply vessel, of the standard Russian design on an easterly course from a supply base to a rig offshore. The supply ship’s course which, if one reads their defense aright, happened to be within a deep water buoyed channel marked for the benefit of coal carriers on their way to a power station. The Yao Hai was approaching the CP1 and CP2 buoys, the outer marks of this channel on a course which would have put it on the starboard side.
The bulk carrier had a senior and junior pilot on board, the master and the crew were Chinese. The supply ship was being conned by its master Captain Kulemesin who like the rest of the crew, except for a Chinese advisor, was a Ukranian.
The visibility was about two miles, and at about 2009 the second pilot on the Yao Hai, which was now travelling at about 12 knots, identified a vessel on a possible collision course one point on the starboard bow at about 2.5 miles. The target was the Neftegaz 67 outward bound at about 10 knots. Shortly thereafter the Yao Hai made a small alteration to starboard, the Neftegaz 67 remaining fine on the starboard bow. The co-pilot attempted to attract the attention of the supply vessel by flashing the Aldis in its direction.
At 2010 the two ships showed up as potentially colliding on the Vessel Traffic Centre radar system. At 2111 the pilot asked the co-Pilot to contact the VTC with a request to provide information about the target, and to advise the Neftegas 67 that the two vessels should pass port to port so as to avoid collision.
At 2112 the pilot instructed the Yeo Hai helmsman to alter course slowly to starboard and the ship entered the deep water channel. At the same time the VTC Western Approaches work station contacted the supply vessel and warned it of the impending collision and to take avoiding action. Similarly the harbour workstation contacted the Yeo Hai and warned it of the danger. Thereafter further warnings were issued resulting in no response from the Yeo Hai and an incomprehensible message from the Neftegaz 67.
At 2113 the ships were more or less end on and approaching each other at a combined speed of about 23 knots. The VTC warning system indicated that collision would occur in 1 minute and 17.5 seconds if immediate action was not taken.
This need for action became apparent to both vessels, and the pilot of the Yao Hai gave helm orders altering the heading to starboard. At more or less the same time the Neftegaz 67 altered course to port. Both vessels blew their whistles in what they regarded as being the appropriate manner. In the view of the writer, by the time it gets to whistle blowing it is all too late.
Almost inevitably Yao Hai ploughed into the Neftegaz 67 at a point half way down the main deck on the starboard side. The bulbous bow of the bulk carrier penetrated the starboard stern tube and the bow itself holed the hull in the area of a store aft of the engine room. The impact of the bulbous bow on the prop shaft rolled the supply ship to starboard, ie towards the oncoming Yao Hai.
The Neftegaz 67 rapidly took a starboard list. The open watertight doors below decks allowed water to enter the engine room, and the stability assessment attached to the marine investigation report determined that the ship had capsized due to free surface underdeck, and also that if the watertight doors had been shut the ship would have remained afloat.
The report on the accident hardly mentions Rule 9 – which is where we came in. Nearly all the required actions according to the investigators should have been taken by the Yeo Hai, which as the giving way vessel should have made early and substantial alterations to starboard to pass outside the CP1 buoy marking the edge of the deep water channel, and in any case it should have slowed down.
The Neftegaz 67 as the stand on vessel should not have altered to port.
One gets the feeling that the VHF comms were disadvantageous, giving the Yao Hai the impression that the Neftegaz 67 would respond. But did the Captain of the latter understand? And why did the court rule that the deep water channel was a ‘narrow channel’ where Rule 9 would be applicable? Despite a reduction in his sentence on appeal Captain Kulemesin is still in prison and will not be released until next year.
THE DANNY FII REPORT
The Danny FII after conversion.
Everybody has a view, and it was the view of the World Society for the Protection of Animals that the deaths of 30,000 animals which were the cargo of the Danny FII is an indication that the transport of live animals by sea is cruel.
Well yes, it probably is, but the deaths of more than 40 of her crew when the ship sank in December 2009, are probably more important. The ship’s captain and the electrician both of whom were lost, were members of Nautilus, the UK based seafarers union, and they called at the time for an investigation into the casualty, particularly since the vessel seems to have overturned in only moderate weather.
As I wrote in early 2010 the Danny FII was a converted car carrier, and it is still possible to see details of the conversion in places on the internet. My question then was, could the animals themselves have acted as free surface.
But now, having waited for nearly four years the Panamanian authorities have completed their investigations, but the Nautilus Telegraph writes that the investigation is to remain confidential. Can this possibly be legal. If it is, it is certainly not morally acceptable.