The East Shore was a small supply vessel, owned by the British company Offshore Marine, which was overcome by rough seas in the Mediterranean on  January 1 1974, with the loss of all hands. This review is a summary of the report of the formal investigation carried out in London in July and August 1975, in accordance with the requirements of the Merchant Shipping Act 1894. 

THE VESSELS INVOLVED

This is the Kent Service, formerly the Kent Shore, probably a sister ship of the East Shore. Photo Paul Gowan.

The East Shore was a small supply ship built in 1966 of 668 gross tons, 165 feet (50.3 metres) long and 37 feet (11.3 metres) wide. It was powered by two Lister Blackstones providing a total therefore of 1600 bhp, and with a bow thruster providing about 100 bhp of thrust. It was a conventional offshore vessel, with an open deck of about 100 feet (30.5 metres) aft of the accommodation. On top of the accommodation was the Bridge which was provided with controls forward and aft. Pertinent to the event were the positions of what the report describes as “engine casings” but were what we would call funnels, which in the conventional Gulf of Mexico supply ship of the day, were positioned half way down the Main Deck. Extending forward and aft from the inner sides of these funnels were the rails and stanchions which made up the crash barriers. Outboard of the crash barriers were the air and sounding pipes for the underdeck tankage, including the diesel tanks. There was a door into the Cement Room and the Engine Room on the starboard side of the Main Deck at the aft side of the forward housing. There were escape hatches from the Engine Room at the aft quarters. 

The ship was crewed by six personnel most likely, although the report does not mention all ranks, a Captain, a Chief Mate, an AB, a Chief Engineer, Second Engineer and a Cook. 

The ship was provided with two lifeboats and two 20 person throw-over liferafts. However the port side lifeboat was completely unserviceable and both the liferafts were overdue for inspection. The ship’s certification was also out of date. None of this would be likely to make any difference to the course of the event.

The Felice d’Amico which stood by the East Shore was a medium sized Italian general cargo vessel cargo.

The Nipponica was a 20000 gross ton Lloyd Triestino container ship, built in 1972. It also stood by the casualty and attempted to take it in tow.

PREAMBLE

The East Shore was loaded up in Sete, a port close to Marseilles, with 171 lengths of 13³/₈” casing, plus some other pipework, heavy items and containers. The whole deck cargo weighed 249 tons. There was probably some underdeck liquid cargo as well, although the report did not specify this. However it thought that the vessel was stable and had a freeboard of a little less than three feet.

The cargo was lashed by the crew, at least in part, with chains.

THE SEQUENCE OF EVENTS.

January 16 1974.

1800. The East Shore departs Sete on a southsoutheasterly course for the drillship Pelican situated somewhere close to Sfax off the coast of Tunisia. The weather is fine and the Engine Room escape hatches are seen to be open.

January 17 1974.

Early Morning. A northwesterly wind develops, reaching gale force at about dawn. Rough seas and a heavy swell are probably associated with the storm.

0750. Marseilles Radio receives a radio message from East Shore. This says “QTH 42N05E Need assistance immediately – cargo seems to have shifted”. The position is about 80 miles from the nearest land and is reported to, or intercepted by, Crossmed the French air sea rescue service in Toulon. Crossmed arranges for aircraft to fly over the East Shore and directs ships to its position.

0835. East Shore sends a further message to Marseilles Radio: “No more electricity on board – engine turning over slowly and steering slowly. No ship in the vicinity.”

0902. The East Shore reports to the agents in Sfax that it will not be able to reach the destination and that the cargo has been lost or damaged. The agents pass the message on to the owners. The agents attempt unsuccessfully to contact the ship, but are advised by Marseilles Radio that it is in difficulties.

0903. East Shore sends another message to Marseilles Radio: “No more engine, no more electricity. Await assistance – situation critical”.

0905. An aircraft from Crossmed overflies the ship and takes photographs. These show that the lashings have failed on some of the pipes. Some have jumped the crash barrier, and one is leaning against the Engine Room casing and the port bulwark. The ship is listing to port.

1058. The East Shore reports “No immediate danger”. And the radio station reports that the Felice d’Amico had agreed to take it in tow. 

1110. The cargo ship Felice d’Amico closes up with the East Shore. It observes that some of the cargo has shifted considerably, although the remaining lashings prevent it going over the side. The ship is rolling heavily in Beaufort Scale 6 to 7 winds and heavy seas are cascading over the deck.

1126. The East Shore reports the arrival of the Felice d’Amico and learns that a tug is due to arrive at 2100. The supply ship also agrees that the Felice d’Amico can take it in tow on the terms of Lloyd’s Open Form. Thereafter the cargo ship makes several attempts to take the supply ship in tow but none are successful.

1140. The container ship Nipponica arrives on the scene, helping the Feliced’Amico by making a lee, and finally attempting to take the East Shore in tow itself. Its attempts are also unsuccessful.

1543. East Shore to Marseilles Radio, “Same position, sea bad.”

1706. Darkness falls with the East Shore still awaiting the arrival of the tug, still with a list of about five degrees. The Felice d’Amico is present but has not made any further attempts to set up the tow. The Nipponica is given permission to depart. In the dark the cargo ship loses sight of the casualty, but remains in radar contact.

2003. The East Shore reports to Marseilles Radio that she cannot await the arrival of the tug whose ETA has been extended to between 0200 and 0300 the following day. 

2040. The Felice d’Amico reports that its deck cargo had shifted. At the same time the East Shore communicates with Marseilles Radio “East Shore reports 25 degree list but crew remain on board”.

2052. At this time the East Shore reports to Marseilles Radio that the crew are abandoning ship.

January 18 1974.

0350. The report suggests that at this time the East Shore sinks.

As soon as the ship announced that abandonment had taking place a search commenced, and this continued over several days with a number of merchant ships, American warships and British and French aircraft, taking part. In the end only three bodies were recovered, together with one partially deflated liferaft and a capsized lifeboat.

THE INVESTIGATION

The investigators considered a number of possible theories as to how the ship had found itself in difficulties, finally settling on damage due to the unsecured pipework moving across the deck, and damaging the funnel casing on the port side and the air pipes for the port side daily service tank. This would have caused the engines to gradually fail, and for a concurrent loss of electrical power.

Thereafter is seems probable that the Engine Room slowly filled up with water but at the same time the deck cargo gradually made its way over the side, resulting in the final large list while the ship was wallowing in the seas and waves were rolling over the deck. 

The investigators also commented on the manning of the ship, lacking as it did, two ABs who should have been present in accordance with the company’s own manning scales, although the enquiry admitted that at time there were no required manning scales for that type of vessel. In fact the ship had recently undertaken a voyage from Luanda to the Mediterranean with a crew of six, and had for a time operated in African waters with a crew of five – lacking a Second Engineer. Before and during the voyage there were a number of exchanges between the ship and the owners, and although it is not explicitly stated in the report, it appears that some of these may have been about relieving personnel who were due for leave. 

Apparently prior to the time the ship sailed from Sete, the Chief Engineer called the Offshore Marine Personnel Manager and requested that two ABs and a Cook/Steward join the ship in Sfax, and the Personnel Manager said in evidence that  he had told the Marine Superintendent and the Assistant Mariner Superintendent what was required. However the two superintendents denied being aware of this requirement, leaving the investigators saying that they “formed an unfavourable view of both witnesses, and felt unable to rely in full on the recollection of either of them or accept the story told by either of them”. It would obviously be disadvantageous to Offshore Marine to have knowingly allowed one of their vessels to embark on ocean voyages so seriously undermanned, and even if there was no regulatory requirement for minimum manning, to sail with a single AB would put a serious strain on some aspects of the ship’s operation.

In fact the enquiry found that the Captain aught not to have sailed with only six crew members on board, and that the company should have ensured that he did not, but then went further to consider whether the low manning had contributed to the disaster. They did not, in the end, consider that having three ABs on board would have made any difference to the sequence of events.

The enquiry also considered some reports which were printed in the marine press, that the master had been instructed not to send a Mayday message (I remember seeing this very article in Lloyds List and was horrified). And they determined that while those who had apparently seen this message in Marseilles, were men of impeccable character, but who “having been aroused from their beds, enjoyed certain hospitality and being somewhat confused in their minds when they first saw any telex message” were actually mistaken.

The investigation went on to suggest that offshore vessel should be properly manned, and that regulations should follow. In fact Merchant Shipping Notice M781 titled “Recommended Manning for Offshore Support Vessels” was issued in 1976.

COMMENT

Looking back it appears that the investigators took a pretty conservative view of the accident, and that their investigation was limited, not only as they said, due to the lack of input from the French emergency services, but also by their superficial research into the manner in which Offshore Marine ships were manned, and the experience of the master and his team. 

Offshore support to the oil industry was still in its infancy and at best masters of UK registered ships had not been doing the job very long. Anecdotally there were tales of ship-owner’s representatives waiting on the quayside when ships arrived in port, with tempting proposals for the crews to get them to leave their current employment and join them.

In addition it was becoming apparent by 1974 that the traditional American design of support vessel, with the funnels half way down the Main Deck was unsuitable for use in the North Sea where the weather could be virtually guaranteed to be unpleasant, and this is maybe why the East Shore was working in the Mediterranean. Offshore Marine had themselves started constructing ships with the funnels just aft of the accommodation structure by 1970, leaving the Main Deck more or less clear of impediments. 

But just as the court had determined, it was probably the failure of the lashings to keep the cargo in check which sealed the fate of the ship. In addition it was not apparent at the time that cargoes of tubulars were capable of retaining water during adverse weather, and therefore reducing the stability margin of offshore vessels.  It may be that in hindsight it could be seen that the Captain had made an error of judgment in not abandoning in daylight, but the enquiry did not find fault with him, maintaining that he would have judged quite reasonably that the crew would be safer on board while the ship was afloat. And indeed it has often proved to be the case that if people had remained with the vessel, rather than evacuating they would have been safe. The report also says that the wind, a mistral, “sprang up”, but even in 1974 one would think some decent weather forecasting would have been available, and the effect of the wind well known. However, even if the master had thought it might be better to defer sailing, in the overly competitive environment which existed offshore in the 1970s it is unlikely that he would have actually remained in port waiting for an improvement in the weather.